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Premises Trans-disciplinary Research
Multi-, Inter- Trans-Disciplinary Research
From multi- to trans-disciplinary research
Multi-disciplinary research means that multiple areas are involved in
the same research activity—results are drawn from and concern
different fields
Inter-disciplinary research means that models, methods and
techniques are brought from one area to a different one—results
mainly concern the latter area
Trans-disciplinary research means that models, methods and
techniques are first brought from one area to a new one; then, once
are suitably extended and generalised, results are brought back to the
original area
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Premises Trans-disciplinary Research
Why X-Disciplinary Research?
Convergence of Scientific Research
Complexity of systems (observed, modelled, constructed) is
characterising more or less all of the human knowledge
The same patterns in observable phenomena, system structure &
behaviour, scientific models, methods, and techniques, occur
repeatedly in many heterogeneous research fields
Convergence towards MAS
Complexity of computational systems today matches complexity of
biological, social, economical, organisational, . . . , systems
Results from other areas dealing with complex systems may be useful
/ important / essential for computational systems & MAS in
particular
Results from computational systems & MAS are already changing the
way in which scientific activity is conducted in every other areas
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Premises Dangling Issues
Questions to be Answered
We already learned something. . .
. . . about the reasons behind the agent abstraction,
as well as some of its features
However, before a complete and precise definition could be given, some
issues have to be clarified
We have to understand. . .
. . . if agents are the next thing after objects, what happens to objects,
then? What about the paradigm shift?
. . . as object-oriented systems are made of interacting objects, are
multiagent systems made of interacting agents—only?
. . . if societies and environment are essential to agent-oriented
systems, how should they be handled in MAS modelling and
engineering?
. . . if agents have to act, which are the objects of their acting?
Finally, we would like to taste. . .
. . . the flavour of X-disciplinary research
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Activity Theory (AT)
Origins of (Cultural-Historical) Activity Theory
Born in the context of Soviet Psychology
Rooted in the dialectic materialism by Marx & Engels
Mostly by the work by Lev Vygotsky (1926-62) [Vygotsky, 1978]
Broadly speaking, AT is a very general framework for conceptualising human
activities – how people learn, how society evolves – based on the concept of human
activity as the fundamental unit of analysis
Activity Theory nowadays
Re-discovered and widely applied in Computer Science and related fields in the last
years [Nardi, 1996]
Mostly in fields like Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and Human
Computer Interaction (HCI)
Brought to the MAS field by both Italian and Spanish groups
e.g., [Ricci et al., 2003]
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Human Activity in AT
Main Focus of AT
AT focuses on human activities
within a social / organisational context
as separated by their respective (physical and ideal) objects
Collaborative activities in AT
Cooperation is understood as a collaborative activity
A collaborative activity has one objective
A collaborative activity is distributed onto several actors, who
participate to the activity
Explicit norms and rules regulate the relationships among individual
participants’ work
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Mediated Interaction in AT
Every Human Activity. . .
. . . is found to be mediated. . .
. . . by mediating artifacts. . .
. . . of heterogeneous nature, either physical or psychological
operating procedures, heuristics, scripts, languages, . . .
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Artifacts in AT
Artifacts are the tools that mediate actions and social interactions
artifacts mediate between individual participants and their environment
artifacts embody the portion of the environment that can be designed
and controlled to support participants’ activities
As an observable part of the environment, artifacts can be monitored
along with the development of the activities
to evaluate overall system performance and
to keep track of system history
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Role of Artifacts in AT
Artifacts can be either physical or cognitive—or, they may have a
twofold nature
example of physical artifacts are shelves, doors, phones, whiteboards,
. . .
example of cognitive artifacts are operating procedures, heuristics,
scripts, languages, . . .
examples of artifacts with a twofold nature (physical / cognitive) are
operating manuals, computers, . . .
Artifacts are both a means but also a product of social activity, so
they embody a set of social practise
their design and structure reflect a history of particular use in some
given social / organisational context
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Artifacts as Enablers and Constrainers of Activities
As mediating tools, artifacts have both an enabling and a constraining
function
enablers artifacts expand out possibilities to manipulate and transform different
objects
constrainers the object is perceived and manipulated through the artifact not ‘as
such’ but within the limitations set by the artifact itself
A simple example: a driving wheel
enabler enables me to change direction while driving a car
constrainer allows me only one way to change direction while driving a car
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Layers for Collaboration Activities in AT
AT identifies a three-layered structure for social (collaborative) activities
[Bardram, 1998, Engestro¨m et al., 1997]
The three layers are labelled as
co-ordinated
co-operative
co-constructive
AT Layers: The Picture
Co-construction
Co-operation
Co-ordination
Reflection on the
Means of Work
Routinisation: Stabilising 
The Means of Work
Implementation: Stabilising 
the Objective of Work
building
artifacts
exploiting
artifacts
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Co-ordination in AT
The co-ordinated aspect of work captures the normal and routine flow
of interaction
Participants follow their scripted roles, each focusing on the successful
performance of their actions, implicitly or explicitly assigned to them
Participants share and act upon a common object, but their individual
actions are only externally related to each other
Scripts coordinating participants’ actions are not questioned or
discussed, neither known and understood in all their complexity
Participants act as “wheels in the organisational machinery”
[Kuutti, 1991], and co-ordination ensures that an activity is working
in harmony with surrounding activities
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Co-operation in AT
The co-operative aspect of work concerns the mode of interactions in
which actors focus on a common object, thus share the objective of
the activity
Here, actors do not have actions or roles explicitly assigned to them
With regard to the common object, each actor has to balance his/her
own actions with other agent actions, possibly influencing them to
achieve the common task
At the co-operation level
the object of the activity is stable and agreed upon
the means for realising the activity is not yet defined
The means for realising a collaborative activity—the artifacts—are
then the object of the co-operative activity, and its results as well
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AT Background from Activity Theory
Co-construction in AT
The co-constructive aspect of work concerns interactions in which
actors focus on re-conceptualising their own organisation and
interaction in relation to their shared objects
Neither the object of work, nor the scripts are stable, and must be
collectively constructed, i.e., co-constructed
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AT Background from Activity Theory
AT Layers: Summing Up
Co-construction
Co-operation
Co-ordination
Reflection on the
Means of Work
Routinisation: Stabilising 
The Means of Work
Implementation: Stabilising 
the Objective of Work
building
artifacts
exploiting
artifacts
Collaborative activities in AT
A collaborative activity is not to be seen in general at one single level
Co-ordination, co-operation, and co-construction are instead to be interpreted as
analytical distinctions of the same collaborative activity, concurring in different times and
modes to its development
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
Agents are not the Only Abstractions Needed
Basic Abstractions: Agents plus Artifacts
Adopting AT as a conceptual framework for MAS social activities has
led to recognise that agents are not the only basic abstractions to
model and build MAS [Ricci et al., 2003]
Artifacts, too, are necessary [Ricci et al., 2006]
to enable and constrain agent actions
to mediate agent interactions with other agents and with the
environment
to model and shape MAS environment
in general, to improve agent ability to achieve their individual and
social goals
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
Relevance of AT Research in MAS
Artifacts are essential—in MAS, too
AT investigation is relevant in MAS since it points out that artifacts are
essential to enable and govern agent actions and interactions within a
MAS
by enhancing agent capabilities to act
by constraining both individual and social activities in a MAS
Role of environment
AT emphasises the fundamental role of the environment in the
development of complex systems
Also, AT suggests that artifacts are the essential tools
[Weyns et al., 2007, Viroli et al., 2005]
to model MAS environment
to shape it so as to make it favourable to the development of collaborative
activities
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
Coordination Artifacts
Artifacts for collaboration and coordination
Coordination artifacts are artifacts used in the context of collaborative activities,
mediating the interaction among actors involved in the same social context
[Ricci et al., 2003]
Coordination artifacts can be either embodied or disembodied, referring to
respectively physically or cognitive/psychological artifacts
Coordination artifacts are social artifacts shared by agents in a MAS, which are
meant to enable and govern the interaction among agents, and between agents and
their environment
Coordination artifacts & media
Coordination artifacts represent a straightforward generalisation of the notion of
coordination medium, as coming from fields like coordination models and languages
and distributed AI
Examples include abstractions like tuple spaces, channels, blackboards, but also
pheromone infrastructures, e-institutions, . . .
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
AT Layers for MAS Collaboration
Layers for MAS collaboration & coordination artifacts
The three levels identified by AT for social activities can be
re-interpreted in the MAS context in terms of the relationship
between agents and artifacts—in particular, coordination artifacts
The three layers are labelled as
co-ordination
co-operation
co-construction
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
AT Layers for MAS in Detail
co-construction — agents understand and reason about the (social) objectives
(goals) of the MAS, and build up a model of the social tasks required
to achieve them—this also involves identifying interdependencies and
interactions to be faced and managed
co-operation — agents design and build the coordination artifacts—either
embodied (coordination media) or disembodied (plans, interaction
protocols, etc.)—which are useful to carry on the social tasks and to
manage the interdependencies and interactions devised out at the
previous (co-construction) stage
co-ordination — agents use the coordination artifacts: then, the activities meant at
managing interdependencies and interactions—either designed a-priori
or planned at the co-operation stage—are enforced/automated
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
Levels of Use of Artifacts
Co-ordination: both intelligent and non-intelligent agents could coordinate
Any agent (either intelligent or not) can simply exploit artifacts to achieve its own goals
by simply taking artifacts as they are, and use them
Co-operation: intelligent agents could change artifacts to change MAS
Intelligent agents could possibly reason about the nature of the artifacts as well as on
the level of achievement of their goals, and take the chance to change or adapt the
artifacts, or even to create new ones whenever useful and possible as the result of either
an individual or a social activity
Co-operation: MAS engineers could embody social intelligence in artifacts
In the same way, MAS engineers can use artifacts to embody the “social intelligence”
that actually characterises the systemic/synergistic (as opposed to compositional) vision
of MAS [Ciancarini et al., 2000], but also to observe, control, and possibly change MAS
social behaviour
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AT Lessons Learned: From AT to MAS
AT Layers for MAS Collaboration: The Picture
AT Layers for MAS: The Picture
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Distributed Cognition in Short
Distributed Cognition. . . [Kirsh, 1999]
. . . is a branch of cognitive sciences
which proposes that human cognition and knowledge representation
rather than solely confined within individuals
is distributed across individuals, tools and artifacts in the environment
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Cognition is Distributed
Cognition transcends individuals
Intelligent processes in human activity go beyond the boundaries of
individual actors
Knowledge is not confined within human minds
Cognition transcends individual cognition
Knowledge representation transcends individuals
Knowledge representation does not pertain individual humans only
Representation is distributed
partially in the mental spaces of humans
as external representations of memories, facts, and information of any sort
distributed on the objects, tools and instruments that constitute the
environment
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Distributed Cognitive Systems
Analysis of Distributed Cognition focuses on distributed cognitive systems
People interact with external cognitive artifacts containing knowledge
represented in some form
Human intelligent behaviour results from the distributed interactions
with other humans and with cognitive artifacts
In the overall, this defines and determines the context where human
activities are situated
that is, the physical, cultural and social context that also guides,
constrains and partially determines intelligent activities
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Cognitive Artifacts
Cognitive artifacts: a definition [Norman, 1992]
those artificial devices that maintain, display, or operate upon
information in order to serve a representational function and that
affect human cognitive performance
Cognitive artifacts are. . .
. . . a product of human design and work
. . . aimed at aiding or enhancing our cognitive abilities
like post-its, calendars, agendas, computers, etc.
. . . not mere amplifiers of our cognitive abilities
cognitive artifacts also modify the nature of the tasks to be performed
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Personal vs. System View
System view
Individuals plus artifacts altogether as a (functional) subsystems
Understanding activities requires to consider (cognitive) actors and
(cognitive) artifacts altogether
Actions are sometimes mediated sometimes targeted to artifacts, and
cannot be fully understood without them
Personal view
Individuals as subsystems affected by artifacts
Practical reasoning is deeply affected by artifacts
Individuals should change the way in which they represent actions,
plan, deliberate and finally act
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Environment in Distributed Cognitive Systems
Environment has a key role in distributed cognitive systems
In distributed cognitive systems, the nature of the environment
on the one hand, depends on the artifacts and tools that shape it
on the other hand, determines the efficiency and effectiveness of the work and
activities of the actors that are immersed in it
Work environment
How do we define a working environment for individuals and organisations?
it mostly depends on the tasks that have to be carried on inside
Real work environments are a complex superposition of social, cultural,
cognitive, and physical constraints
How should the environment be understood as a complex analytical construct
when the goal is environment design?
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
Coordination in Distributed Cognitive Systems
Observing real world activities
An effective environment for a successful activity is a shifting coalition
of resources and constraints
some physical, some social, some cultural, some computational
involving both internal and external computational resources
Activity is successful whenever such a coalition is suitably coordinated
lack of coordination means failure of activity
Coordination is then essential, and concerns activities, resources and
constraints
at both the individual and the social level
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Distributed Cognition Background from Distributed Cognition
The Function of Action in Distributed Cognitive Systems
What is the purpose of an activity?
A dominant assumption is that the point of activity is to change the
environment in a way that (presumably) leads to goal satisfaction
Many action however do not make sense under this assumption
most communication actions, but not only them
for instance, people undertake actions to save attention, memory and
computation; people recruit external elements to reduce their own cognitive
effort by distributing computational load
this make sense if people is situated
As a result, environment design should not merely be aimed at helping
people to achieve their goals
it should also be designed to make other actions easy
such as epistemic, complementary, coordinative actions
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Distributed Cognition Lessons Learned: From Distributed Cognition to MAS
Cognition Outside Agents
Cognition & knowledge representation do not belong to agents only
Objects & tools in the environment may participate to the cognitive
processes
Structure of MAS environment may explicitly represent knowledge
Cognition & knowledge representation are distributed in the environment
Artifacts are essential parts of the MAS cognitive processes
Cognitive artifacts encapsulate knowledge as explicitly represented
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Distributed Cognition Lessons Learned: From Distributed Cognition to MAS
Agent View vs. MAS View
Personal / agent view
Once artifacts are exploited, they change the way in which agents act
and reason about action
System / MAS view
In order to understand and possibly evaluate agent (social) action
within a MAS, one should consider agent(s)+artifact(s) altogether
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Distributed Cognition Lessons Learned: From Distributed Cognition to MAS
MAS Environment is Structured
(Cognitive) artifacts shape MAS environment
Artifacts determine the structure of MAS environment
Knowledge is distributed in the environment, and encapsulated within
cognitive artifacts
Structure of the environment, and knowledge it contains, affect the
activities of agents within MAS
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Distributed Cognition Lessons Learned: From Distributed Cognition to MAS
MAS Action & Coordination
MAS coordination depends on environment structure
Environment structure changes the nature of agent action
Environment structure affects agent mutual interaction
Environment structure modifies the way agents coordinate in a MAS
Environment structure should be designed to
help agent actions to achieve their goals
help epistemic, complementary, coordinative agent actions easier /
effective
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Sociology Background from Sociology
Agents & Goals
Cognitive interpretation of (social) action [Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995]
Agents in a society can be generally conceived as either goal-governed or goal-oriented
entities
goal-governed entities refer to the strong notion of agency, i.e. agents with some forms of
cognitive capabilities, which make it possible to explicitly represent their goals, driving the
selection of agent actions
goal-oriented entities refer to the weak notion of agency, i.e. agents whose behaviour is
directly designed and programmed to achieve some goal, which is not explicitly represented
In both cases, agent goals are internal
External goals
External goals refer to goals that typically belong of the social context or environment
where the agents are situated
External goals are sorts of regulatory states which condition agent behaviour
a goal-governed system follows external goals by adjusting internal ones
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Sociology Background from Sociology
Entities without Goals
Not every entity involved in (social) actions has a goal
Within a society, there are entities that are explicitly designed to
provide a function
Artifacts are such objects
they have a function associated
Artifacts have no goals to achieve
they may have a destination associated
a destination is external goal attached to an artifact by an agent, in the
act of using it
destination is then associated to the use of an artifact
destination is related but not identical to function: an artifact can be
used according to a destination that differs from its designed function
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Sociology Background from Sociology
On the Relation Between Agents & Artifacts
[Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995]
Use & use value
When facing an artifact, an agent may adopt different perspectives
Evaluating an artifact for use, to select it among many others, and then
to use it, to achieve agent’s own goals, are two different matters
Different sorts of external goals are associated by an agent to an artifact
use value the use-value goal, according to which the artifact should allow user agents
to achieve their objective—this drives the agent selection of the artifact
use the use goal, which directly corresponds to the agent internal goal—this
guides the actual usage of the artifact
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Sociology Background from Sociology
Articulating the Agents & Artifacts Relationship
How could an agent deal with an artifact?
There are at least three different ways an agent can exploit an artifact
use by merely using it, according to its function, and
associating it to a destination
selection by selecting it for future use, according to its function,
its possible future destinations, and the agent’s goals
and plans
construction & manipulation by adapting & changing an existing
artifact, or by creating a new one for future use, thus
designing its function, according to its possible future
destinations, and the agent’s goals and plans
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Sociology Lessons Learned: From Sociology to MAS
Goals in MAS
Agents have goals
strong agency Agents have explicitly-represented goals
weak agency Agents have implicitly-represented / encoded goals
Artifacts have functions
Artifacts have no internal goals
Artifacts have a pre-designed function
An artifact is associated with an external goal (its destination) by
agents in the act of using it
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Sociology Lessons Learned: From Sociology to MAS
Agents & Artifacts Interacting
Aspects of agent-artifact relationship
use An agent can use an artifact, according to its use goal, associating it with
a destination
aware use because the agent is aware of the artifact’s function
unaware use because the artifact’s use is encoded in the agent by the
programmer / designer
selection An agent can select an artifact for future use, according to its use-value
goal, reasoning about its possible future destinations and use goals
construction / manipulation An agent can modify an artifact to adapt its function to
some required use-value goals and to its possible future destinations
or, an agent can create ex-novo a new artifact with an agent-designed
function according to some required use-value goals and to its
possible future destinations
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Sociology Lessons Learned: From Sociology to MAS
MAS Engineers Designing Agents
Basic choices to make in agent design
Should an agent be aware of artifact’s behaviour and structure, and
of how to use them?
should an agent be able to reason and deliberate about artifact use?
Should an agent be aware of artifact’s function and possible uses?
Should an agent be able to act over artifacts to modify them and
adapt their function?
should an agent be able to create ad hoc artifacts ex novo?
Should a MAS engineer be able to act over artifacts to modify them
and adapt their function, or, to create new artifacts, at run-time?
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Sociology Lessons Learned: From Sociology to MAS
MAS Engineers Designing Artifacts
Basic issues in artifact design
How should an artifact be made in order to be ready for agent’s use?
either aware, or unaware
possibly, within an open system
How should an artifact be made in order to be ready for agent’s
evaluation and selection?
How should an artifact be made in order to be ready for agent’s
modification and adaptation?
How should MAS environment be structured in order to allow artifact
run-time creation and modification?
by agents and MAS engineers?
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CSCW Background from CSCW
Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)
Basic issues in CSCW
CSCW aims at automating human cooperative work through computational
procedures
However, two diverging strategies are currently emerging
[Schmidt and Simone, 2000]
automation stressing computational procedures to automate coordination of
activities
flexibility stressing the flexibility of computational procedures with respect
to intelligent coordination by collaborating actors
The former approach emphasises coordination by the computational entities
ruling collaboration, the latter coordination by intelligent collaboration entities
Main problem: the two strategies diverge, they should instead converge
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CSCW Background from CSCW
Automation vs. Flexibility: Key Issues in CSCW
Mutual awareness for flexibility
Mutual awareness means that the actors of a collaboration activity
affect and mutually perceive the other actor’s activities through the
shared workspace
The so-called common field of work can reveal / conceal portions of
the collaboration activities to the participants
Mutual awareness is then the basis for opportunistic, ad hoc alignment
and improvisation, which ensure flexibility to collaborative activities
Coordinative artifacts for automation
Coordinative artifacts are the rulers of collaboration
They work more as constrainers rather than as commanders
By giving structure to the common field of work, coordinative
artifacts encapsulate those coordination responsibilities that are better
to be automatised in order to achieve efficiency in cooperation
In all, coordinative artifacts
work as constrainers they define and govern the space of the
admissible articulation of activities
work not as commanders they do not impose a pre-defined course of
actions that could cause unnecessary rigidity and reduce
the required flexibility
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CSCW Lessons Learned: From CSCW to MAS
Automation of Collaboration Activities in MAS
Coordinative artifacts for automation of MAS collaboration
Coordinative artifacts rule MAS collaboration, working more as
constrainers rather than as commanders
Coordinative artifacts structure MAS common field of work, as
specialised abstractions automatising and making collaboration
efficient
As constrainers, coordinative artifacts define and govern the space of
the admissible articulation of MAS collaboration activities
On the other hand, they do not impose a pre-defined course of
actions, promoting flexibility of intelligent agent coordination, and
respecting agent autonomy
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CSCW Lessons Learned: From CSCW to MAS
Flexibility of Collaboration Activities in MAS
Mutual awareness for flexibility of MAS collaboration
Shared MAS environment should be structured as the MAS common
field of work to allow agents to mutually perceive each other’s
activities (mutual awareness)
MAS common field of work can reveal / conceal portions of MAS
collaboration activities to the agents
Mutual awareness promotes opportunistic alignment and improvisation
of agent activities, and ensure flexibility to MAS collaboration
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Anthropology & Ethology Background from (Cognitive) Anthropology & Ethology
Anthropology: The Logocentric Philosophical Bias
Human capacity of language as the main sign of intelligence?
Western anthropology has long dwelt on such a point
The relation between language, use of tools, and evolution of intelligence has
long been neglected [Hewes and Arcos, 1993]
Human capacity of developing and using tools as a fundamental sign of intelligence
Humans forge & use tools
The first characterisation of Homo Abilis is its ability to forge tools
tool using vs. tool making distinction
This is a clear sign of intelligence
Evidence of co-evolution of language and tools use along with human
intelligence is overwhelming in modern anthropological studies
[Gibson and Ingold, 1993]
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Anthropology & Ethology Background from (Cognitive) Anthropology & Ethology
Ethology: Tools, Animals, and the Tooling Test
Use of tools is not an exclusive feature of humans
Beavers build dams, bees construct perfect hexagonal cells, many
birds live in self-made nests, . . .
Ethologists commonly measure intelligence of animals by making
them face problems that require the use of tools to be solved (e.g.
[Povinelli, 2000])
A sort of tool-equivalent of the Turing test has been proposed by
philosopher Ronald Endicott, which was aimed at evaluating
intelligence in terms of the ability to exploit tools
the so-called “Tooling Test for Intelligence” [Wood et al., 2005]
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Anthropology from Theologists: Tools & Self-Awareness
Use of tools reveals awareness of self [Martelet, 1998]
When using a tool, a creature shows it is able to distinguish and
identify itself from the world around
The use of a tool reveals awareness of self, and of the environment as
well
whenever a tool is built with a goal, it is stored for further / repeated
use, it is used for building new tools, etc.
Tools are at the same time the first and the most distinctive
expression of human intelligence, along with language
They are the most powerful amplifiers of the (both individual and
social) human ability to affect the environment—to survive
environment change, first, and to change the environment for the
human purposes, then
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Lessons Learned: From (Cognitive) Anthropology & Ethology to
MAS
The Logocentric Philosophical Bias in MAS
Agent capacity of language as the main sign of agent intelligence?
Research on MAS still dwells on the logocentric bias
Intelligent use of tools by agents is typically neglected
as a stunning example, FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents) just
ignore pragmatic / physical agent actions, and only focuses on agent
communication actions
Agent ability of developing and using tools as a sign of agent intelligence
A notion of tool for agents is needed
Agents should be able to use tools
Intelligent agents should be able to forge & adapt tools
A theory of physical / pragmatical action should be developed for agents, as
refined as the one for communication actions
Such a theory should focus on tool use / creation by agents
The notion of Agens Faber goes along this very direction [Omicini et al., 2006]
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Lessons Learned: From (Cognitive) Anthropology & Ethology to
MAS
Tools, Agents, and the Tooling Test
Use of tools should be a feature for agents in a MAS
MAS researchers should be able to measure intelligence of agents by
making them face problems that require the use of tools to be solved
A sort of tool-equivalent of the Turing test for agents using tools
should be defined, aimed at evaluating agent intelligence in terms of
the ability to exploit tools
a sort of “Tooling Test for Agent Intelligence”
Agent intelligence should then be measured by both the agent ability
to communicate and by agent ability to use tools
the two abilities should be somehow strictly related, and “co-evolve” in
some sense—a common theory of agent action could be of use here
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